SEBI has recently enacted the SEBI (Investment Advisers) Regulations.
This was passed after many years of foot dragging. The main reason for the
delay was a concern that the regulator may bite more than it could chew. After
all investment advisors and distributors number in lakhs, and the task of
regulating so many was ambitious. The views which have appeared in the media
over the past two weeks range from the ‘regulations exempt almost everyone’ to
‘widely framed regulations…almost amounting to an overkill’. The reality is
probably in between. This piece critically looks at four developments brought
about by the regulations.
First is the scope of the regulations. It broadly covers anyone who gives investment advice for a
fee to residents of India. Who it excludes from registration and regulation is
interesting. It exempts people not providing advice in the area of securities.
So an insurance advisor need not register. This is sensible, given turf wars
between financial regulators in the past. Hopefully, the regulations would set
the benchmark for other financial regulators to catch up to. It also excludes
those who provide investment advice incidental to their main business. Chartered
accountants and lawyers are predictably exempt. This is also appropriate,
though I’m not sure how a lawyer can give investment advice incidentally.
Another exemption extends to stock brokers, portfolio managers and merchant
bankers who are already registered with SEBI, but these entities are only
exempt from the registration provisions, not the substantive provisions of the
regulations. This is logical, once a person is registered with SEBI she already
falls under the domain of SEBI for such things as conduct and inspection.
Making substantive parts apply would ensure that they do not misconduct
themselves while avoiding duplication of registration. Where SEBI gets into
interesting territory is where it exempts AMFI registered distributors
providing investment advice incidental to their primary activity. So it appears
that distributors can provide investment advice, that they need not register
with SEBI and the substantive provisions of conduct do not apply to them. This
broad exemption seems contrary to the aim of the regulations which is that
distributors are sellers of the creators of financial products (known in
industry jargon as manufacturers) and thus have an incentive to market the
product which provides the juiciest commissions. SEBI rightly exempted
distributors of mutual funds because the task is too big for its limited
bandwidth. However, the exemption is too broad since it exempts them from the
substantive conduct provision of the regulations. Clearly, distributors of
mutual funds should be subject to the same fairness requirements and code of
conduct as is applicable to investment advisors and stock brokers.
Second, the regulations seek to segregate the advisory
hat from the commission based hat of the advisor/distributor. While as
discussed in the previous para, the distributors have been given a long rope
and are exempt from regulation, other provisions of the regulations try to
build a wall around conflict free advice and conflicted distribution. There is
a requirement of segregating commission based activities from the advisory
ones, no commission for products advised on and an arms length distance between
adviser activities and other activities like distribution and brokerage. These
are sensible, though the way the conflicting provisions on distribution pan out
needs to be seen. In particular, it is not clear how a sole proprietor, as most
advisor cum distributors are today, would segregate their small offices. Many
distributors cum advisors are currently under the mistaken belief that they
must give up one hat, this is not correct, but SEBI needs to clarify this more
clearly.
Third, there are basic qualifications and
certifications required for those people out on the field giving advice. This
has been made applicable to all people who give advice in a corporate set up.
This is a positive development and certification from FPSB and other certified
authorities will be required before advice is given. A requirement for capital
adequacy, though the number required is low, is out of place. It is not clear
why an investment advisor needs capital. We need smart advisors not rich ones.
Fourth, the substantive provisions provide for acting
in a fiduciary capacity, full and honest disclosure of all relevant facts, disclosure
of all conflicts, providing suitable advice based on the risk profile of the
client, restriction on self trades where advice on those has been given and
record keeping. These are eminently right and provide a well regulated
framework.
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